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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1989, Patrick Finucane, a prominent Irish de-
fense lawyer, was killed in his Belfast, Northern Ireland home.'
Masked gunmen murdered Finucane as he sat at Sunday din-
ner with his wife and three young children.2 The following day,
the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), a loyalist paramilitary
group, claimed responsibility for the execution, alleging that
Finucane had been a member of the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army (PIRA).3 At the Coroner's Inquest in September
1990, a police superintendent acknowledged that there was no
basis for the claim that Mr. Finucane was a member of the
PIRA, finding that he was a "law-abiding citizen going about his
professional duties in a professional manner."4 However, Mr.
Finucane's involvement with the Irish Republican Army (IRA),
primarily as a defense lawyer, was cited as the reason for the
1 See Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers:
The Case of Northern Ireland, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 87 (1994).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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killing.5 Patrick Finucane was the first lawyer murdered as a
result of the conflict in Northern Ireland.6
Ten years later, on March 15, 1999, Rosemary Nelson, an-
other prominent Irish civil rights lawyer, died outside her Lur-
gan home as a result of a car bomb. 7 Just prior to her death,
Mrs. Nelson filed an official complaint alleging that members of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had assaulted her.8 The
alleged assault occurred when she tried to represent her clients'
interests in the Garvaghy Road case during the 1997 marching
season. Mrs. Nelson had received credible death threats that
were known to the RUC, and many human rights organizations
had urged the British Government to ensure her safety; how-
ever, she was never offered government protection. 9 These vio-
lent deaths and the threats that preceded them illustrate the
problems faced by Northern Ireland's criminal defense lawyers
who represent clients suspected of terrorist activities.
This paper will examine allegations that the RUC routinely
intimidate, harass, and threaten defense lawyers who represent
terrorist suspects. Part II will provide a historical background
on the formation of the independent Irish Free State, later
called the Republic of Ireland, and Britain's retention of six
counties in the Ulster province which comprise the modern-day
Northern Ireland. Part II will also describe the religious and
civil rights problems in Northern Ireland that gave rise to the
formation of paramilitary terrorist groups, and the special
emergency laws enacted by Parliament in response to terrorist
activities in Northern Ireland. Part III will discuss the role of
the police in Northern Ireland and complaints about the RUC.
These complaints include allegations of RUC partisanship with
5 Howard J. Russell, New Death Breathes Life Into Old Fears: The Murder of
Rosemary Nelson and the Importance of Reforming the Police in Northern Ireland,
28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 199, 202 (1999).
6 Id. at 199.
7 Elisa Massimino, Paying the Ultimate Price for Human Rights: The Life
and Death of Rosemary Nelson, 27 FALL HUM. RTS. 3, 4 (2000).
8 See id.
9 Id. Amnesty International, British Irish Rights Watch, Committee on Ad-
ministration of Justice, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights urged the British government to ensure Rosemary Nelson's safety.
Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Inde-
pendence of Judges and Lawyers, personally interviewed Rosemary Nelson in
1997, and wrote to the British government expressing concerns about her safety.
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Protestant paramilitary groups and also charges that police
routinely commit human rights violations against suspects de-
tained under the emergency laws. Defense lawyers allege that
they are regularly harassed, threatened, and intimidated by the
police, and that members of the RUC may have participated in
the killings of Patrick Finucane and Rosemary Nelson. Part IV
will propose implementing the reforms suggested by the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, and the recommendations of Human Rights Watch.
These reforms, which will improve policing in Northern Ireland
and check RUC abuse of defense lawyers, are necessary if Brit-
ain is to uphold its responsibility to protect human rights.
II. BACKGROUND
The British presence in Ireland dates from the reign of
Henry II, but when England became a Protestant nation under
Henry VIII, Ireland remained predominantly Catholic. 10 Under
British rule, large numbers of Protestants settled in Northern
Ireland, leading to religious tensions between the two regions.
Britain's "plantation scheme" transplanted loyal British sub-
jects, mostly Scottish Presbyterians and English Anglicans, to
Ulster. 1 The Crown assured their loyalty with money, gener-
ous land grants, and military power to supress Catholic resis-
tance. 12 Britain controlled Ireland's economic resources, and
Protestants held political and economic power throughout the
region. 13
In this climate of repression, Catholics began a movement
for nationalism, and ultimately the IRA was formed by militant
Irish-Catholics to wage war against the British presence in Ire-
land. 14 Formed prior to the partition of Ireland, the IRA is ille-
gal in the United Kingdom as well as in the Republic of
Ireland.15 The IRA is a secret paramilitary organization that
10 See Alexander C. Linn, Reconciliation of the Penitent: Sectarian Violence,
Prisoner Release, and Justice Under the Good Friday Peace Accord, 26 J. LEGIS.
163, 164 (2000).
11 Christine Taylor, Northern Ireland: The Policing of Domestic Violence in
Nationalist Communities, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 307, 326 (1995).
12 Id. at 327.
13 Id.
14 Linn, supra note 10, at 165.
15 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25, 31 (1979-80).
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emerged during the struggle for independence to oppose Brit-
ain's presence in Ireland. 16 The IRA does not accept the exis-
tence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. 17
A. Home Rule and the Partition of Ireland
Historically, Northern Ireland has been a society divided
between Catholics who consider themselves Irish and Protes-
tants who consider themselves British. i8 Following World War
I, the Republicans achieved their goal of independence for part
of Ireland.19 The British Parliament passed legislation creating
the Irish Free State, which had self-governing status within the
British Commonwealth.20 However, the law provided six coun-
ties in the province of Ulster with the option to remain part of
the United Kingdom. 21 In 1922, those six counties opted out
and Ireland was partitioned, 22 with the twenty-six southern
and western counties falling within "Home Rule" jurisdiction. 23
The counties subject to Home Rule were essentially Nationalist
and historically sought greater independence from Britain.24
The six counties contained a majority of Protestants loyal to
Britain and remained within the direct rule of Parliament.25
The island was divided along religious lines, with the
predominantly Catholic section falling within the Free State
and the predominantly Protestant north remaining under Brit-
ish rule. 26 At the time of the partition, the northern counties
were approximately two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catho-
lic. 27 Today, Catholics comprise a larger percentage of the pop-
16 See Linn, supra note 10, at 165.
17 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
18 Brian P. White, Walking the King's Highway: Peace, Politics and Parades in
Northern Ireland, 1 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 175, 204-05 (2000).
19 See Linn, supra note 10, at 166.
20 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
21 Id.
22 Elizabeth Kondonijakos, The Reasonable Suspicion Test of Northern Ire-
land's Emergency Legislation: A Violation of the European Convention of Human
Rights, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 99, 102 (1996).
23 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
24 Linn, supra note 10, at 165.
25 See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland's Criminal Trials Without
Jury: The Diplock Experiment, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 239, 241 (1999).
26 Id. at 240.
27 White, supra note 18, at 217.
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ulation in the North, but they retain their minority status. 28
The twenty-six counties of the Free State left the British Com-
monwealth and became the Republic of Ireland in 1949.29 The
six northern counties remained part of the United Kingdom,
with a separate government and parliament in addition to
twelve seats in the British Parliament. 30 With the exception of
a few matters, the Northern Ireland Parliament retained au-
thority over the six counties until 1972, when the British au-
thorities resumed direct rule of the province.
31
Two factions seek to define Northern Ireland's political and
cultural identity, Unionist and Nationalist.32 Unionists are
Protestant descendants of the British immigrants who came to
Ireland during British rule.33 This majority, traditionally al-
igned with England, has no desire to become part of the Free
State.34 Staunch Unionists, called Loyalists, make up the hard
line fringe that uses violence and terrorism to gain its political
ends. 35
Nationalists are the Catholic minority who desire reunifica-
tion with the rest of Ireland. 36 "Historically, Ulster's Catholics
suffered discrimination and repression by Protestants who con-
trolled the political and economic resources."37 The memory of
their suffering makes Nationalists unwilling to accept British
rule.38 Political extremists in the Nationalist camp are called
Colonial history has left Northern Ireland with a legacy shared by many
of the world's trouble spots: the problem of the double minority. Within
their own enclave of Northern Ireland, Protestants outnumber Catholics
by a ratio of five to four. However, in the wider context of Ireland, Protes-
tants are easily outnumbered by a ratio of three to one ... [Tihe inevita-
ble and disastrous result was the advent of a ruling establishment with
the reins of power in its hands but acting under the stresses of a besieged
minority. Thus, two competing, and often mutually exclusive traditions
formed at the extremes, Catholic Nationalism and Protestant Loyalism.
Id. at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 See White, supra note 18, at 205.
29 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 40.
32 See Linn, supra note 10, at 166-67.
33 Id. at 167.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 166.
36 Linn, supra note 10, at 167.
37 Id.
38 See id.
20031
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Republicans. 39 Republicans have a history of resorting to vio-
lence to achieve their goals. 40 The social and political instabil-
ity arose from the culture conflict.41 It has plagued Northern
Ireland with repeated periods of violent turmoil.42
B. The Troubles
The Northern Ireland Parliament, called the Stormont, be-
gan operations in 1922 and, from its inception, has been con-
trolled by a Protestant majority. 43  Protestant leaders
consistently used their powers to pursue discriminatory policies
against Catholics in employment, housing, and voting rights. 44
In the late 1960s, Catholics in Northern Ireland, responding to
this discrimination, began a civil rights movement. 45 Dormant
since 1922, the IRA re-emerged, as did Loyalist paramilitary
groups. 46 The movement and the resulting civil unrest eventu-
ally erupted into violence, which the Protestant-dominated
RUC seemed powerless to prevent.47 By the summer of 1969,
the already politically explosive "parade season" was more vio-
lent and chaotic than ever.48 Parliamentary civil authority and
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See White, supra note 18, at 205.
42 Id.
For all of its political life, Northern Ireland was ruled by a single party,
invariably consumed with the single issue of maintaining the relationship
with Britain and preserving the border with the Irish republic to the
south. Any real attempt at political or social change has been swamped
by this obsession. As a result, Northern Ireland suffers from a deep psy-
chosis in which rational thought and action are inevitably overtaken by
emotional spasms the moment it comes under stress.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 See Kondonijakos, supra note 22, at 103.
44 Id.
45 See White, supra note 18, at 233. In the late 1960s, the Catholic civil rights
movement in Northern Ireland departed from the habitual Catholic rejection of
any connection to Great Britain, instead asserting that they were entitled to the
same civil rights as all British subjects. When the Catholics demanded their
rights as British citizens, rather than proclaiming their allegiance to the Irish re-
public, they stripped the Protestants of their traditional justification for excluding
Catholics from political power. Id. at 232-33.
46 Kondonijakos, supra note 22, at 103.
47 Linn, supra note 10, at 167.
48 See White, supra note 18, at 236. In July and August 1969, "Catholic civil
rights marches were met with violent Protestant resistance, the Orange parades
[Vol. 15:411
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control vanished. 49 In August 1969, the British Army deployed
troops to Northern Ireland to respond to the increasing vio-
lence, and the soldiers have remained ever since.
50
Catholics initially welcomed the British Army.51 However,
within a year, the Catholic support for the occupation disap-
peared after several bloody confrontations between British
troops and Catholic protestors. 52 Paramilitary groups on both
sides of the conflict began using terrorism to further their politi-
cal goals. 53 The government declared war on the IRA and pur-
sued a policy of confrontation with the Catholic community.
54
After the government instituted the policy of interning sus-
pected terrorists without trial, the IRA "appeared to assume an
offensive and indiscriminately bloody posture."
55
The IRA responded to internment with a full-scale bombing
campaign.5 6 In August 1971, more than 100 explosions rocked
Belfast, killing thirty-five people.57 In an incident remembered
as "Bloody Sunday," the British Army opened fire on 20,000 un-
were more triumphal and taunting than usual, Catholics obliged Protestant provo-
cation by overreacting, and the resulting riots were more ferocious than usual." Id.
49 See id. at 237.
50 Kondonijakos, supra note 22, at 103.
51 White, supra note 18, at 236-37.
52 See id. at 237. By 1970,
It]he British army's reactionary tactics led to repeated confrontations
with mobs in Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast and to the deaths of
Catholic protestors. These tactics drove the most moderate Catholics to
press for communal self-protection. The IRA was reborn as defenders of
Catholic neighborhoods, and it soon gained broad support in the Catholic
community.
Id.
53 Linn, supra note 10, at 167.
54 White, supra note 18, at 237.
The Army and the RUC engaged in broad "security sweeps" of Catholic
ghettoes, rounding up men and boys on the thinnest suspicion of IRA in-
volvement. Matters only became worse when on August 9, 1971, British
Prime Minister Heath and the new Northern Irish Prime Minister Brian
Faulkner initiated internment, without charges or trial, of any suspected
terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.
Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See White, supra note 18, at 238.
Catholics of all political persuasions came together in opposition to the
Stormont. Moderate Catholics joined huge Republican protests, held de-
spite an official ban, and the Catholic opposition to the Protestant govern-
ment and its British overseers crystallized in a massive civil disobedience
20031
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armed Catholic protest marchers who were gathered in Derry
for an anti-internment demonstration. 58 Seven of the thirteen
protestors killed were teenagers. 59 Catholics rioted throughout
Ireland and the IRA stepped up its violence, killing fifty-six
British soldiers by March 20.60 Reacting to the rising death toll,
the British government first suspended, then abolished the
Stormont and imposed direct rule.61
As they were in 1969, tensions in Northern Ireland are typ-
ically at their highest during the summer parade season. 62 Loy-
alist fraternal orders hold processions, portrayed as traditional
marches expressing their religious and cultural heritage.63 The
emotional power of these parades is incomprehensible to outsid-
ers who view the parades simply as expressions of political ar-
guments. 64 To the marchers, the ritual re-deifies past heroes
and martyrs. 65 Nationalist groups perceive the marches as a
forum for the Unionists to re-enact historic triumphs of Protes-
tants over Catholics. 66 Problems arise when Loyalist groups in-
campaign, including tax and rent strikes that lasted more than three
years.
Id. at 237-38 (internal quotations omitted).
58 White, supra note 18, at 238.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Molly R. Murphy, Northern Ireland Policing Reform and the Intimidation
of Defense Lawyers, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1882 (2000).
62 Rasnic, supra note 25, at 242.
63 Julia A. Hall, To Serve Without Favor: Policing, Human Rights and Ac-
countability in Northern Ireland, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1997).
64 See generally White, supra note 18, at 206.
65 Id. at 206 n.152.
Selective memory and an affinity to historic social and political divisions
results in a powerful phenomenon in which living individuals conceptual-
ize themselves as the most recent extension of a long and painful history.
Mythical as well as legendary heroes have assumed a sort of immortality,
so that the passage of nearly nine hundred years of history is felt by the
current participants to have occurred within their own lifetimes. While
each community has its immortal heroes, each community similarly feels
that the ancient atrocities, suffered at the hands of the other, occurred
within the current generation. This collective memory phenomenon re-
sults in an odd cartoonish sense that time has stood still; contemporary
Orangemen feel themselves to march alongside their orange forefathers,
while contemporary Nationalist neighborhood groups feel themselves to
stand with the nationalist rebels and protestors of the last four hundred
years to oppose such marches.
Id. at 206.
66 Hall, supra note 63.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/3
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sist on routing their marches through Nationalist
neighborhoods. 67 During the week of July 12, when Protestants
"celebrate the 1690 defeat of Irish forces by William of Orange,
the violence is so extreme that most stores barricade their
storefronts to avoid windows being smashed and property being
torched."68 "In 1997, more than 1500 bombing incidents and
837 attacks on security forces in Belfast resulted from a Protes-
tant Loyalist parade in the week preceding the celebration
day."6
9
The continuing widespread terrorism has caused the RUC
to view its role as that of a security force in a war zone, and the
political situation has given rise to extraordinary legislation de-
signed to restore order.70
C. The Emergency Laws
The British Parliament has enacted legislation to combat
the rise in terrorism in Northern Ireland. In 1972, the North-
ern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) was passed, and
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was enacted in 1974. 71
The PTA contains provisions comparable to the EPA, but ap-
plies throughout the entire United Kingdom. 72
Passed in response to the terrorism, these laws and subse-
quent amendments have radically altered Northern Ireland's
criminal justice system.7 3 Police powers are extended beyond
ordinary bounds while the rights of terrorist suspects are lim-
ited.74 The police have broad power to stop, search, and arrest,
without a warrant, "any person whom they reasonably suspect
to be guilty of certain specified offenses or of being concerned in
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terror-
ism." 75 Police are empowered to stop and question individuals
about their identity and recent movements, to search people
67 See, e.g., id.
68 Rasnic, supra note 25, at 243.
69 Id.
70 See generally Taylor, supra note 11, at 329.
71 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1883.
72 Id. at 1884.
73 See generally Murphy, supra note 61, at 1884.
74 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1885.
75 Id. (quoting Brice Dickson, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND 163
(3d ed. 1993)).
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and residences, and to examine and seize documents, all with-
out prior judicial approval. 76 Police have discretion to hold a
suspect without charge for up to seven days. 77 A person de-
tained under the emergency laws can be denied access to legal
counsel for up to forty-eight hours.78 Detainees do not have the
right to have an attorney present during interrogations, and in-
terrogations are not tape-recorded. 79 Finally, a terrorist sus-
pects' right to silence is restricted by the Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order, which allows prosecutors, judges, and
juries to infer guilt from a detainee's silence.80 These laws es-
tablish a system designed to facilitate convictions based on con-
fessions obtained during extended periods of detention and
interrogation.8 1
A Parliamentary Commission convened to study the
problems emanating from the violence recommended the estab-
lishment of special courts to try certain offenses associated with
political violence.8 2 These "Diplock" courts, named for the com-
mission chairman, consist of a single judge and no jury, and op-
erate under special rules of evidence, trial procedure, and
appeal.8 3 For a suspect detained under these circumstances,
the right to defense counsel is one of the few remaining privi-
leges between arrest and conviction.8 4
III. POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was created in 1922
to serve as the civilian police force in Northern Ireland.85 Al-
though originally intended to be an integrated force, the RUC
has been a Protestant institution since its inception.8 6 Shortly
after its formation, the RUC became an official extension of
76 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 24, §§ 16, 17, 22, 23
(Eng.) [hereinafter EPA ch. 24].
77 Id. § 43.
78 Id. § 45. See also Brennan v. United Kingdom, No. 39846/98, Strasbourg,
October 16, 2001.
79 See generally Murphy, supra note 61, at 1888-89.
80 Id. at 1888.
81 See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 109.
82 Rasnic, supra note 25, at 243.
83 See generally Rasnic, supra note 25, at 244.
84 See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 111.
85 Taylor, supra note 11, at 327.
86 Id.
[Vol. 15:411
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Unionism, and Nationalist communities were the primary vic-
tims of the brutal police practices sanctioned under the emer-
gency laws.8 7 The Nationalists are viewed as a threat to
security, and they have borne the brunt of the RUC's extensive
power.88
Many communities have no traditional police service be-
cause the RUC concentrates its efforts on suppressing political
violence.8 9 Catholics began supporting self-protection and
looked to the IRA to defend Catholic neighborhoods. 90 The IRA
and Protestant paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Defense
Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), have
assumed the abandoned police functions related to ordinary
crime.91 These groups operate their own criminal justice sys-
tems, wherein the paramilitary investigates, prosecutes, and
sits as judge and jury.92 They carry out their own sentences,
including executions, maimings, brutal beatings and expulsion
orders.93 The unlawful and inhumane abuse of police powers
has caused the Catholic community to reject the legitimacy of
the RUC, perceiving it instead as an instrument of state
oppression. 94
A. RUC Powers Under the Emergency Regime
The existing emergency laws give the RUC broad power to
stop, question, and search any person or vehicle. 95 Police may
stop and question any person "for so long as is necessary to as-
certain that person's identity and movements." 96 Anyone may
be stopped and interrogated to determine what they may know
"concerning any recent explosion or any other recent incident
endangering life or concerning any person killed or injured in
any such explosion or incident."97 An officer is not required to
show reasonable suspicion when detaining a suspect and, upon
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 See Hall, supra note 63.
90 See White, supra note 18, at 257.
91 See Hall, supra note 63.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See generally Taylor, supra note 11, at 309.
95 EPA ch. 24, supra note 76, § 25.
96 Id.
97 Id. § 14.
2003]
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stopping a person for such questioning, the officer may search
that person to determine if he or she is carrying a weapon or
transmitter.98 The police may also enter and search any resi-
dence if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the resi-
dence contains weapons, explosives, or other contraband.99
Police may order occupants to stay in a designated room while
the house is being searched. 100 This practice amounts to a form
of house arrest.' 0 ' Police have the right to seize anything they
find during a warrantless search if they believe the object may
be connected to a crime. 10 2
In 1973, the year the EPA was passed, the police raided
75,000 homes, comprising approximately one-fifth of all houses
in Northern Ireland. 10 3 Such abuse of authority has led to alle-
gations that the police use their search and seizure powers to
harass citizens on the most limited suspicion or information. 04
The police have the power to arrest suspects under the EPA, but
those powers are rarely used because under the PTA, the police
enjoy broader authority to arrest and wider investigatory pow-
ers in cases of suspected terrorism. 0 5 This authority permits
police to stop, question, and search people without any suspi-
cion of criminal activity. 0 6 The laws contain a vague definition
of terrorism. 0 7 The amorphous definition and expanded power
under the emergency laws give the police authority to arrest
virtually anyone for any reason.108 A person detained under the
98 Id. § 20(6)(a).
99 Id. § 20.
100 Id.
101 Hall, supra note 63.
102 Kondonijakos, supra note 22, at 105.
103 Taylor, supra note 11, at 329.
104 Hall, supra note 63.
105 See id.
PTA section 14 permits a police officer to arrest, without a warrant, any
person he or she has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of an
offense under provisions of the PTA that prohibit membership in or sup-
port of proscribed organizations or who is or has been concerned in the
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
Id.
106 Id.
107 The PTA define terrorism in § 20 as "the use of violence for political ends,
including any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public of any section of
the public in fear." The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989,
c.4, § 20 (Eng.) [hereinafter PTA].
108 PTA, supra note 107, § 14.
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emergency laws can be held for up to seven days without
charge. 10 9 In the 1988 case of Brogan v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights held that detention of four
days and six hours violated the fair trial provision of article 5(3)
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms. 110 That section states,
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 1.c111 of this article shall be brought promptly before
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees
to appear for trial. 112
In the Brogan case, four suspects had been detained for periods
from four days and six hours to six days and sixteen and one
half hours.11 3 The court ruled that detention of such duration
failed to protect the detainees' right to be brought before a judge
in a reasonable time, as required under the fair trial
provision. 114
The British government responded to this ruling by enter-
ing its derogation under article 4 of the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)"1 5 and under article
15 of the ECHR, 116 in order to retain the seven-day detention
109 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1884.
110 See Brogan et al v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 117 (1989);
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4 1950, art. 5 § 3, 231 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
111 Paragraph 1 of the ECHR states:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law: . . .(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offense or when
it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offense
after fleeing or after having done so.
Id. art. 5 § 1(c).
112 Id. art. 5 § 3.
113 See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 117.
114 See id.
115 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
116 ECHR, supra note 110, art. 15.
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power. 117 These articles permit parties to the respective agree-
ments to deviate from certain of their obligations during times
of public emergency that are deemed to threaten the life of the
nation. 118 Each agreement reserves obligations from which no
derogation is permitted," 9 and each limits a party to taking
only those measures strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation. 20
Under Northern Ireland's emergency laws, police can delay
a suspect's access to legal counsel for the first forty-eight hours
of detention if authorized to do so by a senior police officer.' 2 '
This provision is intended to prevent a detainee from communi-
cating via defense counsel with co-conspirators and providing
them with information and warnings that could impede the
ongoing investigation. When granted, access to counsel consists
of a half-hour conference, after which another forty-eight-hour
period of denied of access can be authorized. 122 The conference
may be required to take place within sight and hearing of an
RUC officer.' 23 Critics find the delay in access to counsel dis-
turbing because police typically continue the interrogation dur-
ing the delay, often using improper methods. 124 Rosemary
Nelson vehemently criticized this RUC tactic, 25 and other de-
fense lawyers believe that the true reason for delaying access to
counsel is to "obtain incriminating information during
interrogation." 26
117 See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Legal Developments: The Fortification of an Emer-
gency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353, 1365 (1996). These treaties permit a state
signatory to suspend certain treaty obligations during an emergency that poses a
"threat to the life of the nation." Id. at 1367 (quoting Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur.
H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 15, 31-32 (1961)).
118 See ICCPR, supra note 115, at art. 4, sec. 1. See also ECHR, supra note
110, art. 15.
119 A party is not permitted to derogate its obligations regarding respect for the
right to life, the prohibition of torture, or the prohibition of slavery or forced labor.
See ECHR, supra note 110, art. 15(2); ICCPR, supra note 115, art. 4(2).
120 See ICCPR, supra note 115, art. 4(1); ECHR, supra note 110, art. 15.
121 EPA ch. 24, supra note 76, § 47.
122 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 112.
123 Id.
124 Russell, supra note 5, at 213.
125 Id. (citing Rosemary Nelson, How the RUC Tried to Smear and Intimidate
Me, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 21, 1999, at 16).
126 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 114.
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The EPA provides that a detained person has the right to
have a friend or relative informed of his or her arrest. 127 This
notification, however, can be delayed for as much as forty-eight
hours on authorization of an RUC superintendent. The UN
Committee Against Torture has twice expressed the fear that
deferral of notification of arrest coupled with deferral of access
to counsel in the first forty-eight hours amounts to "detention
incommunicado, thereby creating conditions which might lead
to abuses of authority by agents of the State."128
Until 1996, RUC regulations did not permit defense counsel
to be present during interrogations. The RUC changed its pol-
icy in 1996, stating that each detainee's request for counsel dur-
ing interrogation would be considered on the merits of the
particular case. However, defense lawyers report that the RUC
routinely denies applications for attorney access to interroga-
tions.1 29 When the application is denied, the suspect is not able
to consult with counsel, and neither the suspect nor his attor-
ney will know why the suspect is being interviewed. 130 Inter-
views may be devoid of any safeguards for the suspect's rights.
The RUC does not permit interrogation sessions to be video or
audio taped.131 Instead, interviews are observed via a system of
closed-circuit television cameras.1 32 Officers who are not part of
the interrogation team are responsible for monitoring many
screens at a time, and for reporting any mistreatment. 133
Most convictions for terrorist acts result from confessions,
and a suspect who seeks to suppress his confession alleging that
it was coerced bears the burden of proving that the police acted
improperly. 34 This burden, coupled with the fact that "the
closed-circuit surveillance system has not yielded a single disci-
127 EPA ch. 24, supra note 76, § 44.
128 Hall, supra note 63 (quoting UN Committee Against Torture, Consideration
of the First Periodic Report of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, CAT/C/
SR.91, Nov. 15, 1991).
129 See Hall, supra note 63 (citing Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview
with Peter Madden, Madden & Finucane, Solicitors, Belfast (Nov. 8, 1996)).
130 See Kevin Dooley Kent, Basic Rights and Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Can
Britain's Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 Be Reconciled
With Its Human Rights Act, 33 VAND. J TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 265 (2000).
131 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 108.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1888.
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plinary proceeding on detainee mistreatment," permits the
RUC to mistreat detainees with impunity. 13 5 Prosecutors are
seldom prevented from admitting involuntary confessions
under a system where the defendant must produce prima facie
evidence that the police subjected him to "torture, to inhuman
or degrading treatment, or to any violence or threat of violence"
in order to induce him to make a statement. 136 A defendant has
difficulty proving coercion without audio or video tape of inter-
rogations. 137 Evidence of coercion is especially rare in a setting
where the only others present are those who possess the oppor-
tunity and incentive to entice the confession in the first place. 38
B. The Detainee's Right to Silence
Although not specifically part of the emergency powers, the
1987 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order effectively
expands police power by abrogating a detainee's right to si-
lence. 139 Under the Order, a judge or jury can draw inferences
of guilt from a suspect's silence if, under police questioning, he
fails to mention facts material to his defense or fails to account
for his presence or for the presence of marks or objects that con-
nect him to a crime.' 40 A suspect whose access to counsel has
been delayed and who is interrogated during the delay period
faces a dilemma. He is cautioned under the Criminal Evidence
Order in the following terms:
You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but I
must warn you that if you fail to mention any fact which you rely
on in your defense in court, your failure to take this opportunity
to mention it may be treated in court as supporting any relevant
evidence against you. If you do wish to say anything, what you
say may be given in evidence. 141
135 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 108.
136 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1888.
137 See id.
138 Id.
139 See generally Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British Style, A Dec-
ade of Experience with Adverse Inferences from Silence, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 243, 254-57 (2000).
140 Criminal Evidence Order, 20 N. Ir. Stat., No. 198 (1988).
141 See Brennan, supra note 78, [ 52.
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On one hand, a defendant runs the risk that silence may be
used against him. 142 On the other hand, any statement he
makes before he consults his lawyer may be used as evidence
against him.143 In a system that relies heavily on confessions to
obtain convictions, a suspect's access to legal counsel is of para-
mount importance because most detainees will not know the
consequences of speaking or remaining silent.144 If the suspect
is charged and ultimately tried, the Criminal Evidence Order
permits the judge and jury to draw inferences of guilt if the de-
fendant refuses to testify.' 45
Complicating the suspension of the right to silence is the
fact that neither the detainee nor his lawyer will necessarily
know why the client is being questioned, and the lawyer may
not be permitted to be present while his client is being inter-
viewed.' 46 In that case, the client will have to remember and
apply his lawyer's advice during the interview. A prominent
British civil liberties lawyer observed, "This means not only will
it be impossible for solicitors to advise their clients adequately,
but that once they have been consulted the clients themselves
will be expected to understand and apply complex legal princi-
ples. Their failure to do so will have dire consequences.' 47
C. The RUC and Defense Lawyers
The RUC's extraordinary powers under the emergency
laws, combined with the suspension of the right to silence and
easy admissibility of confessions, create "a system that gives the
security forces every incentive to rely on confessions obtained in
custody, and, in turn, to impede solicitors who are often the only
significant hurdle in the race to obtain convictions." 148 Lawyers
complain of systematic official harassment aimed at them sim-
ply for fulfilling the requirements of their profession, and of pro-
cedures that impair access to clients and generally obstruct due
142 See Berger, supra not- 139, at 254-55.
143 See Kent, supra note 130, at 265-66.
144 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1888 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 See Aolain, supra note 117, at 1381-82.
146 See Kent, supra note 130, at 265-66.
147 See id. at 266 (citing Geoffrey Bidman et al, Recognising Rights-A Look at
the Progress of the Human Rights Bill and Analysis of the Impact of the Govern-
ment's Rushed Anti-Terror Legislation, 95 L. Soc'y GAz. 22 (1998)).
148 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1890.
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process. 149 Defense lawyers are subjected to body searches
before they are permitted to enter courts, prisons or detention
centers, while prosecutors are not. 150 While the RUC insists
that this is a security measure, no solicitor has ever been found
smuggling contraband to a client. 15 1 Detectives at the deten-
tion centers typically make threats about the solicitor a de-
tainee has requested, but most defense lawyers are accustomed
to such harassment.152 Defense lawyers often feel that they are
viewed by the RUC as the only obstacle to extracting confes-
sions, which, under the emergency laws, invariably lead to
convictions. 153
Widespread allegations of RUC intimidation of defense
lawyers have given rise to formal inquiries by several human
rights organizations.154 A 1992 Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights mission to Northern Ireland interviewed lawyers who
represented detainees under the emergency laws. 155 Several
lawyers interviewed received death threats from the RUC and
almost all reported some form of official intimidation. 156 The
International Commission of Jurists conducted a study that
showed defense lawyers in Northern Ireland received more
death threats than in any other part of the European Union.1 57
149 See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 98-100.
150 Id. at 100.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 99.
153 Id. at 106-07.
154 See Hall, supra note 63; Russell, supra note 5, at 207.
155 See id.
The Lawyers Committee mission.. .interviewed solicitors, barristers, for-
mer detainees, journalists, government officials, police officials, and
human rights activists. The mission conducted in-depth, personal inter-
views with nine of the approximately 30 solicitors who regularly defend
clients in the Diplock courts. The mission corroborated the solicitor's ac-
counts, to the extent possible, by reviewing records the solicitors provided,
by checking court, newspaper, and other human rights report accounts,
and by raising the solicitors' allegations in other interviews.
Id. at 98 n.46.
156 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1890-91. One detainee describing the RUC in-
terrogator's response when she asked to be represented by the firm of Madden &
Finucane, the law firm established by Peter Madden and Patrick Finucane stated,
"[o]ne of the interrogators said that Patrick Finucane had ended up in a body bag
and that another solicitor at Madden & Finucane would end up the same way." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
157 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1888.
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In 1997, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the In-
dependence of Judges and Lawyers conducted a mission to
Northern Ireland.158 That mission investigated allegations that
RUC officers at detention centers routinely abused and
threatened solicitors. 159 The reported abuse ranged in severity
from harassment and minor inconvenience to physical assault
and death threats. 160
Defense lawyers view this intimidation as an occupational
hazard and have come to expect it.161 They accept the harass-
ment, "noting that in the absence of audio-recording there is
only hearsay evidence to prove the allegations, that is, the word
of the client against that of the RUC officer."'1 62 Few lawyers
bother to file complaints, feeling it futile since the RUC would
conduct any investigation into such complaints.
163
Death threats are the most severe form of official intimida-
tion reported by solicitors and their clients.'6 4 Nearly every so-
licitor interviewed received death threats. Typically, such
threats are conveyed by RUC officers to the solicitor's clients
during the course of interrogation.
165
158 See Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur to the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54th
Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.4 (1998) [hereinafter Report of
the Special Rapporteur].
159 Id. 15.
The abuse against lawyers takes various forms ranging from mild forms
of harassment (e.g., solicitor kept waiting to see his client) to interference
in the solicitor/client relationship (e.g., telling the detainee that the solici-
tor is not interested in him or her, that the solicitor's advice should be
ignored, that the solicitor is representing the paramilitaries and not the
client, etc.) to physical abuse and/or death threats.
Id.
160 Id. % 15. The report cites the case of a solicitor who had received numerous
death threats because she represented a client accused of murdering two RUC of-
ficers. This solicitor also represented a residents group who oppose an Orange
Order parade through their Catholic housing estate. While representing the re-
sidents during a confrontation with police the solicitor reported being spat at,
struck, and accused of being an IRA sympathizer, all by RUC officers. The report
does not name the interviewees, for their own protection. However it is clear from
the details provided that the subject solicitor is Rosemary Nelson, whose murder,
less than two years later, is described later in this section.
161 Id. 91 20.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 99.
165 See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 99.
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Another troubling aspect of the problem is the encourage-
ment RUC abusers receive from high-profile government offi-
cials who publicly identify defense lawyers with their clients'
causes. 166 For example, three weeks before Patrick Finucane
was murdered, Douglass Hogg MP, during a committee debate
in the House of Commons, charged that defense lawyers in
Northern Ireland colluded with the IRA.167 Hogg, then the Par-
liamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, said,
"I have to state as a fact, but with great regret that there are in
Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympa-
thetic to the cause of the IRA."' 6 8 Other officials have publicly
made unsubstantiated statements identifying defense lawyers
with terrorist causes. 169 These statements by highly-placed
public officials give voice to an undeclared policy that encour-
ages the police to engage in harassment and intimidation. 170
On February 12, 1989, Patrick Finucane was killed when
two masked gunmen entered his home and shot him fourteen
For example, a young Belfast solicitor maintains that in recent instances,
clients who reported threats to harm them and their solicitor were later
shot dead. In one incident a client, Martin O'Prey, related to McGrory
police statements that both he and "that wee shit McGrory" would be
killed. O'Prey was soon murdered.
Id. at 99 n.50.
166 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 100.
167 Id.
168 See id.
Seamus Mallon... challenged Hogg, stating: "That is a remarkable state-
ment for a Minister to make about members of a profession who have
borne so much of the heat in a traumatic and abnormal situation. Such
words should not be said without the courage to support them. I find it
appalling that the Minister should make such an accusation with such
emphasis and without, it seems, the intention of substantiating it. I have
no doubt that there are lawyers walking the streets or driving on the
roads of the North of Ireland who have become targets for assassins' bul-
lets as a result of the statement that has been made tonight. Following
the Minister's statement, people's lives are in grave danger. People who
have brought cases to the European Court against this legislation will be
suspected. We have thrown a blanket over many lawyers in the North of
Ireland, and it will be on the head of this Minister and Government if the
assassin's bullet decides to do, by lead, what this Minister has done, by
word."
Id. (citing Hansard, House of Commons, Standing Committee B., Jan. 17, 1989,
col. 508, 519.).
169 See Id. at 101 n.56, 57.
170 See Id.
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times.171 The UFF, a Protestant paramilitary organization, im-
mediately claimed responsibility for the death.172 Finucane,
one of Northern Ireland's best-known criminal defense lawyers,
and his partner, Peter Madden, regularly represented clients
detained under the emergency laws. 173 In addition to his work
challenging human rights abuses related to the emergency
laws, authorities were hostile to Finucane because three of his
brothers allegedly belonged to the IRA. 174 Prior to his death
Finucane received numerous death threats from RUC officers,
mainly through his clients. 1
75
There is credible evidence that suggests the security forces
were frustrated by Finucane's success and played a part in his
murder.' 76 Brian Nelson, an operative from the UDA who also
worked as a confidential informant for the authorities, later re-
vealed that he told his RUC and Army handlers as early as De-
cember 1988 that Patrick Finucane was marked for
assassination by Loyalist paramilitaries.177 Nelson claimed
that the security forces leaked documents, photo montages, and
security reports about IRA suspects to the UDA.178 The RUC
conducted an inquiry into Brian Nelson's charges, but the re-
171 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 158, 60.
172 Id.
173 See Hall, supra note 63. Finucane represented high-profile clients such as
Bobby Sands, who was elected to Parliament while imprisoned in the Maze, a noto-
rious British holding facility for Irish internees. Sands was the first prisoner to die
in the hunger strikes called by prisoners in the Maze, who were striking for recog-
nition as political prisoners. See id.
174 See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 98 n.47. No evidence that Patrick Finucane
was involved in any paramilitary activity has ever been adduced.
175 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 158, 62.
One client testified that an RUC officer told him "it would be better if he
(Finucane) were dead than defending the likes of you." The officer
threatened to give information about Finucane to the loyalist paramilita-
ries. Another client alleged that, just five weeks before Finucane's death,
an RUC officer "informed me that my solicitor was working for the IRA,
and would meet his end also. He asked me to give Mr. Finucane a mes-
sage from him. He told me to tell him that he is a thug in a suit, a person
trying to let on that he is doing his job, and that he, like every other re-
publican bastard, would meet his end."
Id.
176 Flaherty, supra note 1, at 99.
177 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 158, 63.
178 See Hall, supra note 63.
2003]
21
PACE INT'L L. REVV
sulting report has never been made public and no one has ever
been prosecuted for the killing.179
Ten years later, on March 15, 1999, Rosemary Nelson was
killed by a car bomb outside her home. 18 0 Nelson's calls for re-
opening the investigation into Patrick Finucane's death made
her "the most recognizable IRA lawyer in Northern Ireland."' 8 '
Nelson began receiving death threats from the RUC after she
won an acquittal for her client, Colin Duffy.18 2 She told Human
Rights Watch that over a three-week period in 1997, twelve of
her clients who had been arrested and held at Gough Barracks
in Armagh reported that RUC officers threatened that she
would be killed. s33 Nelson's clients charged that RUC officers
"put my family under threat, they said 'We'll shoot all of
you.. .You're dead, tell Rosemary she's going to die too.' They
threatened to pass my photo and details to loyalists." 8 4
Nelson represented clients such as the family of Robert
Hamill, who was beaten to death by a loyalist mob while armed
RUC officers parked nearby watched, but failed to intervene. 18 5
At the time of her death, she was planning to bring a private
action against four RUC officers for failing to save Hamill. 8 6
Nelson also represented the Garvaghy Road Residents Coali-
tion, formed to respond to Protestant marches through their
neighborhood.18 7 During the 1997 marching season, she was
assaulted by members of the RUC while representing her cli-
ents' interests.18 8 Six weeks before she was murdered, Nelson
179 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 158, [ 64.
180 Russell, supra note 5, at 202-04.
181 See id. at n.41 (quoting Deaglan de Breadun, Prospect of Decommissioning
a Complete Non-Starter in Wake of Solicitor's Death, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at
6).
182 See Hall, supra note 63.
183 Id. In a Human Rights Watch/Helsinki telephone interview Nelson stated:
When [clients] requested me, immediately things were said about me,
"she's a terrorist, that makes you a terrorist." RUC detectives were mak-
ing these statements. Any time I arrived down, any time the clients were
told I was there, they would say, "she's an IRA woman, she's going to be
shot," or "she's going to be taken out soon."
184 See Hall, supra note 63.
185 Massimino, supra note 7, at 3.
186 Russell, supra note 5, at 204.
187 Massimino, supra note 7, at 4.
188 Id. at 3.
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filed a complaint against the RUC for the assault.18 9 She be-
lieved the RUC officers resented her because she represented
activists whom the RUC wanted to silence.
190
Human rights organizations throughout the world urged
the British government to protect Rosemary Nelson, and in
1997, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers interviewed Nelson and expressed to the
government his concerns for her safety. 19' Amnesty Interna-
tional, British Irish Rights Watch, and Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, among others, echoed those concerns. 92 In
spite of these fears, Rosemary Nelson never received govern-
ment protection. 93
Rosemary Nelson's position as Northern Ireland's top de-
fense lawyer made her an enemy of the police, and there are
widespread allegations that the RUC was involved in her mur-
der. 194 Numerous death threats from the RUC, together with
the large security presence outside her house the night before
the bomb went off have caused some commentators to wonder
how her attackers could have planted the bomb without some
RUC assistance. 95 The police investigation into her murder
has thus far led to no arrests. 196 In any case, the investigation
189 Id. at 4.
190 Russell, supra note 5, at 204.
191 Massimino, supra note 7, at 4.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Russell, supra note 5, at 204 ("[mlembers of Sinn Fein, the political wing of
the IRA, say that the sophisticated bomb that killed Nelson could not have been
constructed by the Red Hand, the group that claimed responsibility. Instead, the
circumstances of the explosion indicate RUC involvement").
195 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1894-95.
196 Id. at 1895-96.
Immediately after the murder, the RUC chief constable announced the
involvement of the Chief Constable of Kent and the FBI in the Nelson
investigation, giving the inquiry "added independence." However, the
FBI had no authority to investigate, could not issue search warrants, and
its role in the investigation concluded only a few months after the murder.
Currently, the Norfolk Deputy Chief Constable heads the investigation
with a team of English and RUC officers. The RUC officers reportedly are
not investigating the collusion allegations. However, because the Deputy
Chief Constable must still report directly to the RUC Chief Constable, and
the investigators from outside Northern Ireland work out of the RUC sta-
tion in Nelson's home town, those with information may be less inclined to
come forward.
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is being conducted out of the Lurgan police station, where the
RUC officers regularly threatened Rosemary Nelson. 197 Many
of the officers who threatened her still work at that station. 198
The murders of Finucane and Nelson demonstrate the por-
ilous position of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland. The
murders of such high profile lawyers, who had tremendous suc-
cess representing their clients, have had a chilling effect on
both the legal profession and the public's confidence in the legal
system. 199 The abuse that characterizes relations between po-
lice and lawyers undermines the administration of justice, and
flies in the face of Britain's obligation to protect human rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The international community has attempted to establish
standards for the independence of the bench and bar to address
the abuse faced by lawyers around the world. One example of
an international standard is the United Nations Principles on
the Role of Lawyers (Basic Principles).200 While not a legally
binding treaty, the Basic Principles operate as a source of cus-
tomary international law. According to Principle 16(a), "Gov-
ernments shall ensure that lawyers are (a) able to perform all of
their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance,
harassment or improper interference... [wihere the security of
lawyers is threatened as a result of discharging their functions,
they shall be adequately safeguarded by the authorities. ''201 It
further states in Principle 18 that, "Lawyers shall not be identi-
fied with their clients or their clients' causes as a result of dis-
charging their functions."202 The situation of lawyers in
Northern Ireland demonstrates that Britain has violated these
principles.
While the RUC is implicated in multiple human rights
abuses, many of them concern abuse of detainees' rights and are
beyond the scope of this paper. This paper is concerned with
197 Massimino, supra note 7, at 4.
198 Id.
199 See Russell, supra note 5, at 199.
200 See generally United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., 8th Cong. on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/2B (1990).
201 Id. at Principles 16 and 17.
202 Id. at Principle 18.
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violations against defense lawyers in the performance of their
professional duties. The best safeguard against violations of de-
tainees' rights is prompt, regular access to lawyers who are free
from police harassment and intimidation. Both the UN Special
Rapporteur and Human Rights Watch have made recommenda-
tions for reforming the RUC with respect to its dealings with
defense lawyers. 20 3
To properly protect defense lawyers, the United Kingdom
should immediately conduct an independent and impartial in-
vestigation of threats made against legal counsel. 20 4 "Where
there is a threat to the physical integrity of a solicitor or barris-
ter, irrespective from whom the threat emanates, the govern-
ment should provide the necessary protection and should
vigorously investigate the threats and bring to justice the guilty
party."20 5 The police must be required to provide protection for
those known to be targets for paramilitary assassination, and to
promptly and thoroughly investigate Loyalist paramilitary vio-
lence. Additionally, the government is urged to establish a pub-
lic, independent inquiry into the Finucane and Nelson murders,
and ensure that the investigation operates without RUC partic-
ipation or influence. 20 6
The United Kingdom must establish an independent unit to
investigate complaints against the RUC 20 7 to provide greater
accountability that will restore public confidence in the judicial
system. Most of the lawyers interviewed in the human rights
inquiries asserted they did not bother to complain about RUC
threats and abuse because they had no confidence in a com-
plaints process wherein the RUC investigated allegations of its
own misconduct. 208
Last, and perhaps most important, the United Kingdom
must establish a mechanism for vetting the police force in
Northern Ireland. Police officers should be screened through a
thorough background check that examines several independent,
203 See Hall, supra note 63.
204 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 158, 91 91(a).
205 Id. T 91(b).
206 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Assessment of the Patten Commission Re-
port, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nireland/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003).
207 Hall, supra note 63.
208 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1897.
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legitimate sources of information to determine if an officer has
been involved in human rights abuses. 20 9 Officers should be
similarly scrutinized for paramilitary connections. If properly
implemented, a vetting mechanism can serve to hold officers ac-
countable for past abusive practices by excluding them from the
police service, while instilling greater confidence that future po-
lice action will be taken in accordance with democratic princi-
ples by a police force that is accountable to the people it
serves.
210
Shortly before her death, Rosemary Nelson testified before
the House International Operations and Human Rights Sub-
committee in Washington, D.C. and described the ongoing har-
assment and threats she encountered in her work.211 When she
was asked why she continued in the face of such obstacles, she
explained, "I believe that my role as a lawyer in defending the
rights of my clients is vital. The test of a new society in North-
ern Ireland will be the extent to which it can recognize and re-
spect that role, and enable me to discharge it without improper
interference. I look forward to that day."212
209 Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper for the Independent Commission on
Policing for Northern Ireland, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/jan/
nireOll6.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
210 See generally id.
211 Massimino, supra note 7, at 4.
212 Id.
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